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Abstract
In this paper, an alternative deﬁnition of stable sets, deﬁned by Mertens [Mertens, 1989. Stable
equilibria – a reformulation. Part I. Deﬁnitions and basic properties. Mathematics of Operations
Research 14, 575–625], is given where perturbations are interpreted as restrictions on the strategy
space instead of perturbations of the payoffs. This alternative interpretation is then used to compute a
special type of stable sets –called standard stable sets – in the context of bimatrix games, exclusively
using linear optimization techniques and ﬁnite enumerations.
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1. Introduction
The ﬁrst systematic investigation concerning the deﬁnition of stability of a normal form
equilibrium was executed by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Their approach differed from
what had been done before. Up till then usually ad hoc remedies were introduced for
speciﬁc shortcomings of Nash equilibrium. Kohlberg and Mertens simply started with the
formulation of a list of desiderata that should be satisﬁed by any reasonable interpretation
of what a stable equilibrium is. Unfortunately, despite several efforts, they did not ﬁnd
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a deﬁnition of stability of equilibrium that featured all desiderata. Several attempts were
subsequentlymadetoﬁndaninterpretationofstabilitythatdidsatisfyalltheirrequirements.
Eventually Mertens (1989, 1991) presented a deﬁnition that satisﬁed all these conditions,
along with a couple of new additions to the list of desiderata.
Original deﬁnition: We will ﬁrst brieﬂy explain how Mertens (1989) deﬁned stable
sets. Since, for reasons we will explain in a moment, we will restrict ourselves to a
two-person context, we will present the terminology only for bimatrix games. The basic
notion in the deﬁnition of stable sets is that of a perturbation. For a bimatrix game, a
perturbation is in fact a pair of non-negative vectors, one for each player. For each player
the number of coordinates of the corresponding perturbation equals the number of pure
strategies of that player. Given such a perturbation, we can deﬁne a new game, that is
played as follows. First let the players of the original bimatrix game each choose a strategy.
Given these choices we add to each player’s choice the corresponding perturbation and
normalize the result. Now the payoff to a player in the perturbed game is simply the
payoff he would get in the original game if the perturbed strategies thus constructed were
played.
Thus each perturbation induces a perturbed game. Such a perturbed game will have a
non-empty set of Nash equilibria. The graph of the correspondence that assigns to each
perturbation its set of perturbed Nash equilibria is denoted by E.
Now stable sets are determined with the aid of the notion of an essential germ. Loosely
speaking, a germ is a connected chunk of the graph E, and such a germ is called essential
when it satisﬁes some essentiality condition when considered sufﬁciently close to the zero
perturbation. In this paper, the essentiality condition itself is phrased in terms of singular
homology groups. It states that the projection from the graph E onto the perturbation space
should induce a homomorphism between homology groups (to be made precise in the
deﬁnition) that is not the trivial map. (This is a slight deviation from the deﬁnition in
Mertens (1989), but it has the advantage that we need not add a statement concerning
Hausdorff limits of semi-algebraic sets. This way we immediately get a purely topological
notion of an essential germ for arbitrary compact parts of the graph E.) Now a set T is called
stable if there is an essential germ in E for which T is the part of the germ directly above
the zero perturbation.
1.1. Aim of the paper
In Mertens (1989) the author is already concerned with the question of computability
of this type of stability in Remark 1, pp 590–593. In this remark, the author sketches an
algorithm for the computation of semi-algebraic stable sets. This algorithm though will
in general, even for bimatrix games, involve ﬁnding solutions to systems of higher-order
polynomial equations. This effect is basically due to the rescaling factor in the deﬁni-
tion of a perturbed game. The algorithm is also based on fairly involved procedures such
as the elimination algorithm of Tarski and the triangulation algorithm for semi-algebraic
sets.
In this paper, we will present an algorithm that is capable of computing a (or all) stable
set(s)exclusivelyusingadditionandscalarmultiplication.Boththealgorithmandtheproof
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1.2. Two provisos
The above assertion is subject to the following two provisos. First of all, we will only
consider bimatrix games. The reason for this is that, for normal form games with more than
two players, even the inequalities that determine the Nash equilibrium set are in terms of
higher-orderpolynomials.Thusitcannotbeexpectedthatlineartechniqueswillbeadequate
tools to solve these games.
Secondly,wewillrestrictourselvestoaspecialtypeofstablesets.Ifthetaskis:compute
one stable set, then this proviso is not relevant (one could after all simply compute a stable
set of this special type, and leave it at that). However, for tasks like: compute all stable sets
or, given a set, check whether or not it is stable, we need some restrictions. This is basically
due to the fact that the only a priori restriction for a stable set is that it be compact and
connected. However, the class of all compact and connected sets is way too general to be
handled effectively only by linear computation techniques. For this reason we will restrict
our domain of sets to a speciﬁc class that we will specify below in the introduction and in
Section 6.
1.3. Contents of the paper
Theresults:Basicallywewilldotwothings.First,wewillshowthatthereisanalternative
deﬁnitionofstablesetsthatdoesnotinvolverescaling.Thismakesthealternativedeﬁnition
more appropriate for being handled by linear computation techniques.
Given this alternative deﬁnition we will construct an algorithm that, given the primitive
data of the game (i.e. the bimatrix) and for the special type of sets we consider, decides in
a ﬁnite number of linear operations whether or not the set is stable.
Alternative deﬁnition: The alternative deﬁnition is based on a reinterpretation of
perturbations. Algebraically speaking, a perturbation is still a vector like we described
above, but the game induced by a perturbation is going to be different. In the alternative
deﬁnition a perturbation is simply a restriction of the strategy space. Given a perturbation,
the players in this new game are only allowed to play strategies that put a minimum
amount of weight on each pure strategy, these minimum amounts being speciﬁed by
the perturbation in question. Thus we get a new, perturbed, game with its own set of
equilibria. The graph of the correspondence that assigns its set of equilibria to each
perturbation is denoted by F. Now we can redeﬁne stable sets by requiring that the
essential germs are supposed to be chunks taken from F instead of E. As it turns out, this
new notion of stability yields the same collection of stable sets as the original notion of
Mertens.
STANDARD STABLE SETS: The advantage of the alternative deﬁnition is that, in the
case of bimatrix games, it preserves the linear structure of the inequalities that deﬁne the
collection of Nash equilibria. Thus, given a bimatrix game, the graph F can be written as
the union of a ﬁnite number of chunks of this graph, each of which is determined by a ﬁnite
number of a speciﬁc type of linear (in)equalities. Such a chunk will be called a polyhedral
chunk of F.
Nevertheless, it cannot be expected that all stable sets of the bimatrix game can be
computed since basically the only ex ante restriction on a candidate-stable set is that it be4 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx
compact and connected (in a strong sense). This still leaves a lot of freedom of choice in
degenerate games like the zero-payoff game in which basically every compact and con-





Roughly speaking, we eliminate the choice problem this way and simply add all possible
choices of strategies to our stable set. Stable sets of this form are called standard stable
sets.
It turns out that a candidate-stable set in question is a standard stable set if and only if
the union of the polyhedral chunks involved is an essential germ. We will show that it only
takes a ﬁnite number of linear operations to either compute all essential germs of this form
(and thus also all standard stable sets) or, given a number of polyhedral chunks of F,t o
decide whether or not it is an essential germ.
Computation: The heart of the algorithm consists of two procedures. The ﬁrst procedure
checks connectedness of the candidate germ under consideration. This is done by explicitly
constructing a combinatorial graph that is connected if and only if the candidate germ is
connected. Checking connectedness of a graph is of course a ﬁnite task.
The second procedure concerns the essentiality condition. We show that, sufﬁciently
close to the zero perturbation, the homomorphism induced by the projection map from the
graph F to the perturbation space can be determined in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Together these two procedures can be used to check whether or not a set in standard
form is an essential germ. Thus, e.g., by a simple enumeration procedure, it is possible to
determine all standard stable sets of the bimatrix game under consideration.
1.4. Organization of the paper
Section 2 summarizes the notation used in this paper as well as several elementary
facts about Abelian groups and bimatrix games. In Section 3 the, slightly adapted, original
deﬁnition of stable sets from Mertens (1989) is presented. In Section 4 we present our
alternative deﬁnition and prove its equivalence with the original one. In Section 5 the
notion of a standard stable set is introduced and the relation with arbitrary stable sets and
maximal stable sets is explained. Finally, in Section 6 the algorithm to compute all standard





of a ﬁnite set M is denoted by |M|.F o ras e tX in Rn, ext(X) denotes the set of extreme
points of X. A set is called a polytope if it is the convex hull of a ﬁnite number of points.
If the dimension of a polytope is one less than the number of its extreme points it is calledD. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx 5
a simplex. A non-empty subset F1 of P is called a face if for any two points x and y in
P and any positive number λ<1 the event that λx + (1 − λ)y is an element of F implies
that both x and y are elements of F.I fF consists of one single point, this point is called an
extreme point or vertex of P.I fF is not equal to P it is called a proper face of P. A set is
called polyhedral if it is the set of solutions to a ﬁnite number of linear inequalities. Given
a topology on a set X and a point x in X, any set containing an open set that contains x is
called a neighborhood of x. X is called connected if it cannot be written as a disjoint union
of two non-empty and closed sets. For a subspace Y of X, the (topological) boundary ∂Y
of Y is the collection of points x in X with the property that each neighborhood of x has a
non-empty intersection with both Y and X \ Y. The closure cl(Y)o fY is the union of Y and
∂Y. The set ˚ Y := Y \ ∂Y is called the interior of Y.
2.1. Abelian groups
For an element g in an Abelian group G and a positive integer n the element ng in G
is deﬁned to be the n-fold sum of g. Furthermore, 0g := 0 where the 0 on the right-hand
side of the equality sign denotes the neutral element of G, and for n ≤− 1, the expression
ng denotes the inverse of (−n)g. A family B ={ gα}α∈I of elements of G is called a basis





set of all functions ϕ : S → Z that take values different from zero only on a ﬁnite number




whereeachnα isanintegerand1 lsα isthecharacteristicfunctionof{sα}.Byabuseofnotation




Note in particular that, in case S is ﬁnite, the Abelian group generated by S equals ZS.N o w
suppose we have two Abelian groups G and H. A homomorphism from G to H is a map
f : G → H such that
f(a + b) = f(a) + f(b)
for all a,b ∈ G.I ff has an inverse map f−1 it is called an isomorphism. A homomorphism
f is called trivial if f(a) = 0 for all a ∈ G.
1 Non-emptiness is not a strict requirement. It is however customary in the deﬁnition of homology groups.
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2.2. Bimatrix games
Throughout this paper we will only concern ourselves with bimatrix games. So, we
assume that there are two players, player I and player II. Player I has a ﬁnite set M and
player II has a ﬁnite set N of pure strategies. The payoff matrices (aij)i∈M,j∈N of player I
and (bij)i∈M,j∈N of player II are denoted by A and B, respectively. Furthermore,
 (M): =
 

















is the set of mixed strategies of player II. The payoff for player I is pAq and the payoff
for player II is pBq when the strategy pair (p,q) is played. For i ∈ M the ith unit vector is
denoted by ei and is interpreted as the situation in which player I is playing pure strategy i
with probability one. Similarly a pure strategy j ∈ N of player II is identiﬁed with ej.W e
will also write   :=  (M) ×  (N).
Deﬁnition 1. A Nash equilibrium of the game (A,B) is a strategy pair (p,q) such that
pAq ≥ p Aq forallp  ∈  (M)
and
pBq ≥ pBq  forallq  ∈  (N).
The collection of equilibria of the game (A,B) is denoted by E(A,B).
3. The deﬁnition of stable sets
In this section we will present a slightly modiﬁed version of the deﬁnition of stable sets
given in Mertens (1989). First we will introduce some notation.
A perturbation for player I is a vector δ = (δi)i∈M with δi ≥ 0 and
 
i∈M δi ≤ 1. The
collection of all perturbations is denoted by P1. Similarly we can deﬁne the collection P2
of perturbations ε = (εj)j∈N for player II. A pair (δ,ε) is also called a perturbation. The
collection of all such perturbations is P := P1 × P2. A perturbation (δ,ε)i nP is called
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and P2(η) is similarly deﬁned. Furthermore, P(η): = P1(η) × P2(η).
3.1. Payoff perturbations
Aperturbation(δ,ε)deﬁnesaperturbedgameinthefollowingway.Thepayoff-perturbed
game associated with the perturbation (δ,ε) is the game (A(δ,ε),B(δ,ε)) with













The payoff matrix B(δ,ε) is deﬁned analogously. The set of equilibria of the perturbed
game is simply E(A(δ,ε),B(δ,ε)). We write E for the graph of the correspondence that
assigns the collection E(A(δ,ε),B(δ,ε)) of perturbed equilibria to the perturbation (δ,ε).
Notice that the choice δ = 0 and ε = 0 returns the original bimatrix game (A,B). Hence,
E(A(0),B(0)) = E(A,B).
3.2. Stable sets
Let S be a closed subset of the product space P ×  .F o rη>0,
S(η) ={ (δ,ε,p,q) ∈ S|(δ,ε) ∈ P(η)}
is the part of S above P(η) and
∂vS(η) ={ (δ,ε,p,q) ∈ S(η)|(δ,ε) ∈ ∂P(η)}
is the part of S above ∂P(η). Usually ∂vS(η) is called the vertical boundary of S(η). Fur-
thermore, let Si(η) be the set S(η) \ ∂vS(η). This is the set of points (δ,ε,p,q)i nS(η) for




j εj <η .
Now notice that the canonical projection π that assigns the perturbation (δ,ε)t o
(δ,ε,p,q) is a map from S(η)t oP(η) that maps ∂vS(η) into ∂P(η). So, the projection
π is a map from the topological pair (S(η),∂ vS(η)) to the topological pair (P(η),∂P(η)).
Hence, as is, e.g., explained in Munkres (1984), it induces a homomorphism π∗ from
the relative singular homology group Hd(S(η),∂ vS(η)) to the relative singular homol-
ogy group Hd(P(η),∂P(η)). The question we now ask ourselves is: how might this ho-
momorphism π∗ look like. And in fact there is not much choice as the next remark
shows.8 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx
Remark.Let C be any convex and compact set of dimension d and let ∂C be its relative
topological boundary (relative w.r.t. its afﬁne hull, that is). Then it is a well-known fact
that the relative singular homology groups Hk(C,∂C) are all trivial, except when k = d,i n
which case it is isomorphic to the group Z of integers.
In particular we see that Hd(P(η),∂P(η)) is the trivial group, except when d =| M|+
|N|, in which case the group is isomorphic with Z. So, for each dimension the induced
homomorphism π∗ is necessarily trivial, except perhaps in case d =| M|+| N|.
These observations are the main motivation for the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2. non-empty, closed set S in P ×   is called a germ if for sufﬁciently small
η>0:
(1) the set Si(η) is connected, and
(2) S(η) = cl(Si(η)).
When for sufﬁciently small η>0 it even holds that
(3) for dimension d =| M|+| N| the homomorphism π∗ induced by the projection π from
the topological pair (S(η),∂ vS(η)) to (P(η),∂P(η)) is not the trivial map,
we say that the germ S is essential.
Even though essentiality of a germ, based on a homomorphism between homology
groups, is a rather abstract notion, it has very intuitive geometrical implications. For ex-
ample, when a germ S is essential, then, for sufﬁciently small η, there does not exist a
continuous homotopy from S(η)t oP(η) that constantly maps the vertical boundary of S(η)
into the boundary of P(η). Roughly speaking this means that, when the germ is viewed as a
plastic foil above the perturbation space that is glued to the vertical boundary, it cannot be
moved to the vertical boundary without either tearing the material apart or unglueing the
germ above the boundary.
Deﬁnition 3. A closed set T in   is called stable if there exists an essential germ S ⊂ E
such that
T ={ (p,q)|(0,0,p,q) ∈ S}.
The above deﬁnition of stable sets differs slightly from the deﬁnition in Mertens in sev-
eral aspects. First of all, Mertens based his deﬁnition on simplicial instead of singular
homology groups. However, simplicial homology is only deﬁned for triangulable sets. As
a consequence of this, Mertens initially uses the above deﬁnition, but with the additional
requirement that the germ involved is semi-algebraic (and therefore triangulable). Subse-
quently he also considers the Hausdorff limits of the stable sets thus obtained to be stable
sets. The advantage of using singular homology is that the above deﬁnition can be used
directly for arbitrary closed sets. This does not make much difference, because for semi-
algebraic (and more generally triangulable) sets both types of homology groups coincide
by Theorem 34.3 in Munkres (1984) and the topological invariance of homology groups.
Finally, another difference is that Mertens considers different coefﬁcient modules, but that
can also be done in singular homology.D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx 9
Nevertheless, the above deﬁnition preserves all major results of the original deﬁnition,
such as existence, perfection, backward induction and ordinality. Existence easily follows
fromtheobservationthatanysemi-algebraicsetthatisstableinthesenseofMertens(1989)
is also stable according to our deﬁnition. Mertens (1989) has shown the existence of such a
set. Perfection is fairly straightforward. Backward induction follows from the observation
that the proof of Hillas et al. (2001) can be applied directly to our deﬁnition to show that
stable sets in the sense used here are also stable in the sense of Hillas (1990). Ordinality can
be shown by proving that our deﬁnition satisﬁes both invariance and admissible-best-reply
invariance. These conditions are sufﬁcient for ordinality as is shown in Mertens (2004) and
Vermeulen and Jansen (2000).
4. An alternative deﬁnition of stable sets
Even though one can obtain results on computability using the original deﬁnition
(see, e.g. Mertens, 1989, Remark 1, pp. 590–593) this deﬁnition is not suited for our
purposes. The problem is that, even for bimatrix games, the linear structure of the
inequalities that characterize the equilibrium set is lost when payoffs are perturbed.
This is basically due to the rescaling factor in the denominator of the perturbation
map. However, there is an alternative way to interpret perturbations in terms of re-
strictions of the strategy spaces. We will ﬁrst show that the resulting notion of stable
sets under this interpretation is equivalent with the original one. In the next section
we will also show that the linear structure of the equilibrium correspondence is pre-
served under this interpretation, and how this fact can be exploited for computational
purposes.
4.1. Strategy perturbations
We will ﬁrst give a reinterpretation of a perturbation. More precisely, given a per-
turbation, we will construct an alternative way to associate a perturbed game with this
perturbation. So, let (δ,ε) be a perturbation. The perturbed game (A,B,δ,ε) is played as
follows. The players are only allowed to play strategy pairs (p,q) in the restricted strategy
space  (δ) ×  (ε) where
 (δ): ={ p ∈  (M)|pi ≥ δi foralli ∈ M}
and (ε)issimilarlydeﬁned.ThepayoffsinthisgameremainpAqandpBq.Anequilibrium
of the perturbed game (A,B,δ,ε) is a strategy pair (p,q) in the restricted strategy space
such that
pAq ≥ p Aq forallp  ∈  (δ)
and
pBq ≥ pBq  forallq  ∈  (ε).10 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx
The collection of equilibria of the perturbed game (A,B,δ,ε) is denoted by E(A,B,δ,ε).
We write F for the graph of the correspondence that assigns the collection E(A,B,δ,ε)o f
perturbed equilibria to the perturbation (δ,ε).2
Deﬁnition 4. A closed set T in   is called strategy-stable if there exists an essential germ
S ⊂ F such that
T ={ (p,q)|(0,0,p,q) ∈ S}
Remark.So, the only difference with the previous deﬁnition is that in this case we require
the germ to be a subset of F instead of E.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof that the above deﬁnition of stability
is equivalent to Mertens’ deﬁnition presented in the previous section. The proof is based
on the existence of a particular homeomorphism from E to F. We will start with a descrip-
























































· (p − δ,δ).
2 For reasons that will become clear in a moment we restrict this correspondence to those perturbations (δ,ε)
for which
 
i δi ≤ 1
2 and
 
j εj ≤ 1
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It is straightforward to show that I1 is the inverse map of J1.3 Similarly we can deﬁne the
map I2 from C2 to D2 with inverse map J2. So, I := (I1,I 2) is a continuous map from C to
D with inverse map J := (J1,J 2).
Lemma 1. The restriction of I to E is a homeomorphism from E to F and the restriction of
Jt oF is its inverse.
Proof. Since I is clearly continuous with inverse J, it is sufﬁcient to show that I maps E
into F and vice versa. So, let (δ,ε,p,q) be an element of E. In other words, (p,q)i sa n






















We want to show that (p∗,q ∗) is an equilibrium of the game (A,B,δ∗,ε ∗). First notice that
p∗ isindeedanelementof (δ∗)andq∗ isanelementof (ε∗).Nowtakeanyotherstrategy
p  in  (δ∗). Deﬁne the strategy (!) p   by
p   :=






Then p  = σ(p  ,δ), p∗ = σ(p,δ) and q∗ = τ(q,ε). So,














qjA(δ,ε)i,j = σ(p,δ) · A · τ(q,ε) = p∗Aq∗
where the inequality follows from the fact that (p,q) is an equilibrium of (A(δ,ε),B(δ,ε)).
This shows that p∗ is a best reply against q∗ within  (δ∗). In the same way we ﬁnd that q∗
is a best reply against p∗ within  (ε∗). Hence, (p∗,q ∗) is an equilibrium of (A,B,δ∗,ε ∗).
Conversely, let (δ,ε,p,q) be an element of F. In other words, (p,q) is an equilibrium
of the perturbed game (A,B,δ,ε). We have to show that J(δ,ε,p,q) is an element of E.
This though follows from an analogous line of reasoning.
Now that we have this homeomorphism from E to F the proof of the equivalence of the
two deﬁnitions of stability presented previously is elementary and discussed below. 
Theorem 1. A set Tin   is stable if and only if it is strategy-stable.
3 For this particular reason we do not require p to be a strategy. When we do include this requirement, this
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Proof. Suppose that T is stable. We will show that T is also strategy-stable. To this end, let
S ⊂ E be an essential germ for T. Since I(S) is a subset of F by the previous lemma, it is
sufﬁcient to show that it is an essential germ for T.
To this end, ﬁrst notice that, for 1 >η>0, I(S(η)) equals I(S)(η/(1 + η)) and
I(∂vS(η)) equals ∂vI(S)(η/(1 + η)). So, I is a map between the pairs (S(η),∂ vS(η)) and










is a map between pairs (P(η/(1 + η)),∂P(η/(1 + η))) and (P(η),∂P(η)). Finally, the com-
position of the maps I, π and b 
equals the projection ρ from (S(η),∂ vS(η)) to (P(η),∂P(η)). So, b∗ ◦ π∗ ◦ I∗ equals ρ∗ by
Theorem 30.1 of Munkres (1984). Hence, since ρ∗ is not the trivial map by assumption, π∗
cannot be the trivial map either. The proof of the converse implication in the statement of
the theorem is virtually identical to the above proof.
Although we only presented the equivalence of both notions of stability in the context
of bimatrix games, the same can be shown for arbitrary n-person normal form games.
5. Standard stable sets
From a topological perspective stable sets can still take on many forms. Essentially the
only restrictions are compactness and connectedness. Therefore it cannot be expected that,
given an arbitrary (bimatrix) game, all stable sets can be computed. If we consider, e.g., the
2 × 2 bimatrix game in which both players receive zero payoffs regardless of the strategies
chosen, it is easy to check that any compact and connected set is a stable set. This huge
degree of freedom of choice is mainly due to the high degree of degeneracy of this game: it
does not matter which (essentially identical) strategies you choose to be part of your stable
set, and consequently any choice is indeed allowed!
In this section we will introduce a speciﬁc type of stable set, called standard stable set,
that turns out to be sufﬁciently well-behaved for purposes of computability involving solely
linear optimization techniques. Roughly speaking, standard stable sets avoid the problem
we just discussed by simply selecting all strategies in case we have freedom of choice.
In this section we will show that in the case of bimatrix games the collection of stan-
dard stable sets is fairly large and still captures the spirit of the notion of stability pretty
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5.1. The linear structure of F
The structure of standard stable sets derives from the linear structure of the graph F
of the equilibrium correspondence. Let (δ,ε) be a perturbation of a bimatrix game (A,B).
For a strategy p of player I in the restricted strategy space  (δ) the δ-carrier Cδ(p)o fp is
deﬁned as
Cδ(p): ={ i ∈ M|pi >δ i}.
Analogously we can deﬁne the ε-carrier Cε(q) of a strategy of player II in the strategy space
restricted by the perturbation ε. For a strategy p of player I the set PB2(p)o fpure best
replies of player II to p is deﬁned by
PB2(p): ={ j ∈ N|pBej ≥ pBel foralll ∈ N}.
Again we can do something similar for player I and deﬁne PB1(q). Using this terminology
we have the following key lemma. Its proof can, e.g., be found in Vermeulen (1996).
Lemma 2. The strategy pair (p,q) is an equilibrium of the perturbed game (A,B,δ,ε)
if and only if the δ-carrier of p is a subset of PB1(q) and the ε-carrier of q is a subset of
PB2(p).
Even though we will not prove this lemma here, we will try to give some intuition for
what it says. Consider the following situation. In the left-hand side picture below, player
I’s pure best responses against q are e2 and e3. So, in the unperturbed case his set of best
responses – represented by the fat line – is simply the convex hull of these two pure best
responses. In the (δ1,δ 2,δ 3)-perturbed case on the right, his set of best responses is simply
the convex hull of the “perturbed versions” (δ1,1 − δ1 − δ3,δ 3) and (δ1,δ 2,1 − δ1 − δ2)
of e2 and e3.
This behavior of best responses of course carries over immediately to perturbed Nash
equilibria, hence Lemma 2. From this geometrical intuition it is also clear that, once the
objective Aq for optimization is kept ﬁxed, the graph of the best response sets over pertur-
bations is linear.
This insight can be used as follows to decompose the graph F into a ﬁnite number of
polytopes. Let I ⊂ M be a set of pure strategies of player I and let J ⊂ N be a set of pure
strategiesofplayerII.WiththesetwosetsofpurestrategieswecanassociateasubsetS(I, J)
of the collection D1 deﬁned above. This set S(I, J) is formally deﬁned as the collection of14 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx
solutions (p,δ)i nRM × RM of the system of linear (in)equalities
pBej − pBek ≥ 0 forallj ∈ J andallk ∈ N
pi ≥ δi foralli ∈ I
pi = δi foralli/ ∈ I.
0 ≤ δi foralli ∈ M
 
i∈M pi = 1
 
i∈M δi ≤ 1
2
The group of (in)equalities after the blank line are merely added to guarantee that p is a
strategy in  (δ) and that (p,δ) is indeed an element of D1 as soon as (p,δ) is a solution
of the above system of inequalities. The ﬁrst group of inequalities states that every pure
strategyinJisabestreplyagainstp.Thesecondandthirdgroupsof(in)equalitiesguarantee
that p the δ-carrier of p is a subset of I.I nD2 we can analogously deﬁne the set T(I, J)b y
a system of linear (in)equalities. We will frequently encounter sets of the form
S(I, J) × T(I, J)
in the remainder of this paper, and we will therefore give these sets a name.
Deﬁnition 5. A set of the form described above is called a polyhedral chunk of F. This
name is justiﬁed by the following straightforward consequence of the previous lemma.
Lemma 3. Each polyhedral chunk of F is a subset of F.
Notice that, since each equilibrium is indeed an element of some polyhedral chunk of
F, this lemma states that F is the union of the collection of polyhedral chunks.
5.2. Standard stable sets
Now we have done enough preliminary work to be able to deﬁne the notion of a standard
stable set. The idea is that, in order to construct a stable set, one ﬁrst needs to decide
which polyhedral chunks are needed, and secondly one needs to select within each of these
polyhedral chunks a collection of equilibria that is sufﬁciently robust. For a standard stable
set we leave out the second step and only decide which polyhedral chunks go into the stable
set, and which do not. Thus we get the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6. A germ S ⊂ F is said to be in standard form if it can be written as the union
of a number of polyhedral chunks. A stable set T is called standard stable if there is an
essential germ S ⊂ F for T that is in standard form.
The next theorem shows that the class of standard stable sets is a sufﬁciently rich class
of stable sets to capture the ﬂavor of stability pretty well. It also immediately implies that
the maximal elements of the (ﬁnite) collection of standard stable sets coincide with the
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Theorem 2. Each stable set is contained in a standard stable set.
Proof. Suppose that T is a stable set and let S ⊂ F be an essential germ for it. Now let A
be the collection of those sets S(I, J) × T(I, J) that have a sequence (δk,ε k,p k,q k)∞
k=1 in
common with S for which (δk,ε k)∞
k=1 is completely mixed and convergent to (0,0). Let V
be the union of these sets. We will show that V is an essential germ in F that contains S(η)
for sufﬁciently small η. For if we can prove that, it immediately follows that
W :={ (p,q)|(0,0,p,q) ∈ V}
is a standard stable set that contains T.
First note that V is a subset of F by Lemma 3. Next we will show by contradiction
that, for sufﬁciently small η, V contains S(η).4 Suppose this is not the case. Then there is a
sequence (δk,ε k,p k,q k)∞
k=1 in S for which (δk,ε k)∞
k=1 converges to (0,0) and none of the
(δk,ε k,p k,q k) are elements of V. Moreover, since S(η) = cl(Si(η)) for sufﬁciently small η,
we may even assume that all (δk,ε k) are completely mixed. Next, by taking a subsequence
if necessary, we can make sure that there is a pair (I, J) such that for all k
Cδk(pk) = I and Cεk(qk) = J
Then however S(I, J) × T(I, J) must be a subset of V by the deﬁnition of V. Contradiction.
Now we will show that V is an essential germ. Take an η>0 such that the requirements
foranessentialgermarefulﬁlledforS(η)andmoreoverS(η)isasubsetofV.Wewillcheck
the three requirements for an essential germ one by one for V(η).
(1) The set Vi(η) is connected. To see this, suppose that there are two closed sets F and
G such that F ∩ Vi(η) and G ∩ Vi(η) are not empty, mutually disjoint and their union
equals Vi(η). We will derive a contradiction.
Since S(η) is a subset of V, also F ∩ Si(η) and G ∩ Si(η) are mutually disjoint and
their union is Si(η). So, it sufﬁces to show that F ∩ Si(η) is not empty. Suppose it is
empty. Then Si(η) must be contained in G. Now take a polytope Q = S(I, J) × T(I, J)
in A. So, by deﬁnition of A, there is a sequence (δk,ε k,p k,q k)∞
k=1 in Q ∩ S for which
(δk,ε k)∞
k=1 is completely mixed and convergent to (0,0). In particular this implies that
the intersection of Q and Si(η) is not empty. So, since Si(η) is contained in G, this
implies that Qi(η) must have a non-empty intersection with G. Therefore, since Qi(η)
is a connected set, Qi(η) ∩ F must be empty. Then however Qi(η) must be contained
in G. This though, since Q was chosen arbitrarily in A, implies that Vi(η) has an empty
intersection with F. Contradiction.
(2) V(η) = cl(Vi(η)). This immediately follows from the fact that V is the union of a ﬁnite
number of polytopes Q in A for each of which Qi(η) is not empty.
(3) Fordimensiond =| M|+| N|thehomomorphismπ∗ inducedbytheprojectionπ from
the topological pair (V(η),∂ vV(η)) to (P(η),∂P(η)) is not the trivial map. To see this,
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ﬁrst notice that S(η) is a subset of V by the choice of η. Then the inclusion map
ι :( S(η),∂ vS(η)) → (V(η),∂ vV(η))
is a map between topological pairs. Furthermore, π|S(η) := π|V(η) ◦ ι where π|S(η) and
π|V(η) denote the respective restrictions of the projection π to S(η) and V(η). Thus we
get that (π|S(η))∗ := (π|V(η))∗ ◦ ι∗ and (π|V(η))∗ cannot be trivial since (π|S(η))∗ is not
trivial by assumption. 
6. Computability of standard stable sets
All standard stable sets can be computed in ﬁnite time. There are several ways to see
this. We will explain one of them. We selected our method of choice not on grounds of
computational speed, but merely for ease of exposition.
First we will show that we can restrict ourselves to germs of a special form. Consider a
ﬁxed pair (I, J) of sets of pure strategies for the moment. Let
ext(I, J): = ext(S(I, J) × T(I, J))
denote the set of extreme points of the associated polyhedral chunk S(I, J) × T(I, J).
Deﬁnition 7. We say that the pair (I, J)i sadmissible if
(1) there exists a point (0,0,p,q)i ne x t ( I, J),
(2) there is no pure strategy i in M such that δi = 0 for all (δ,ε,p,q)i ne x t ( I, J), and
(3) there is no pure strategy j in N such that εj = 0 for all (δ,ε,p,q)i ne x t ( I, J).
Requirement (1) excludes chunks of the graph of the equilibrium correspondence that
are not present directly above the zero perturbation. Such parts of the graph are clearly not
neededinanessentialgerm.Thus,thisrequirementisnotreallycrucial,itisonlyconvenient.
Requirements (2) and (3) are crucial. They guarantee that the associated polyhedral chunk
contains at least one point (δ,ε,p,q) for which (δ,ε) is completely mixed. Together these
requirements guarantee, e.g., that
[S(I, J) × T(I, J)]i(η)
is not empty for all η>0. It is easy to see that every standard stable set has an essential
germ in standard form that consists entirely of polyhedral chunks S(I, J) × T(I, J) for
which (I, J) is admissible. Thus, since admissibility is evidently a ﬁnitely computable
property, we can from now on assume that only admissible pairs (I, J) are used to construct
germs.
Now we have made enough precautions to explain our algorithm. Let J be a set of
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Since V is automatically a subset of F, the set
W :={ (p,q)|(0,0,p,q) ∈ V}
is stable if and only if V is an essential germ. First notice that, by the admissibility of J, the
requirement
V(η) = cl(Vi(η))
automatically holds for all η. We will explain how to test in ﬁnite time whether or not V
features the remaining two requirements for an essential germ. We will basically show that
there exists an η∗ > 0 such that for all η ≤ η∗,
(1) Vi(η) is connected if and only if a certain ﬁnite graph (J,E) is connected, and
(2) π(η)∗ is not trivial ⇔ π(η∗)∗ is not trivial (where π(η) indicates the projection from
the topological pair (V(η∗),∂ vV(η∗)) to the topological pair (P(η∗),∂P(η∗))).
Given these two results it evidently sufﬁces to check whether the graph (J,E) is connected
and whether π(η∗)∗ is not trivial. Thus, the test itself consists of three different procedures,
namely
(1) a procedure that computes η∗ > 0,
(2) a procedure that checks in ﬁnite time whether the graph (J,E) is connected, and
(3) a procedure that checks in ﬁnite time whether the homomorphism π∗ induced by the
projection π from the topological pair (V(η∗),∂ vV(η∗)) to (P(η∗),∂P(η∗)) is not the
trivial map.
We will consider these three procedures one by one. The computation of η∗ is fairly simple.
First, for a polytope S(I, J) × T(I, J) with (I, J)i nJ, compute the collection ext(I, J)o f















Notice that η(I, J) > 0 because (I, J) is assumed to be admissible. Now take
η∗ := 1
4 min{η(I, J)|(I, J) ∈ J }.
This number η∗ will be ﬁxed for the remainder of this paper. The only thing left to do is to
tackle the issues of connectedness and non-triviality.18 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx
6.1. How to check connectedness
Deﬁnetheundirectedgraph(J,E)asfollows.ItsvertexsetisJ.Fortwodistinctelements
(I, J) and (I ,J )i nJ the edge {(I, J),(I ,J )} between these two vertices is an element of
E if and only if the two polyhedral chunks
S(I, J) × T(I, J) and S(I ,J ) × T(I ,J )
haveincommonbothapoint(0,0,p,q)andapoint(δ,ε,p,q)forwhich(δ,ε)iscompletely
mixed.
Theorem 3. For η ≤ η∗, the set Vi(η) is connected if and only if the graph (J,E) is
connected.
Proof. Suppose that (J,E) is connected. Since each intersection of the two elements in an
edge have a point (δ,ε,p,q) (with (δ,ε) completely mixed) in common, it is easy to show
that Vi(η) is (path-)connected.
Conversely, suppose that (J,E) is not connected. So, we can take write (J,E)a st h e
disjointunionoftwographs(J1,E 1)and(J2,E 2).LetFbetheunionoverallsetsS(I, J) ×
T(I, J) with (I, J)i nJ1 and G be the union over all sets S(I, J) × T(I, J) with (I, J)i n
J2. Clearly F and G are closed, non-empty sets and Vi(η) is the union of Vi(η) ∩ F and
Vi(η) ∩ G. So, it is sufﬁcient to show that the intersection of Vi(η) ∩ F and Vi(η) ∩ G is
empty. Suppose on the contrary that the intersection Vi(η) ∩ F and Vi(η) ∩ G is not empty.
We will derive a contradiction.
SincetheintersectionofVi(η) ∩ F andVi(η) ∩ Gisnotemptytheremustbesets(I, J) ∈
J1 and (I ,J ) ∈ J2 such that the intersection Q ∩ R of
Q := S(I, J) × T(I, J) and R := S(I ,J ) × T(I ,J )
has a point (δ,ε,p,q)i nVi(η). Now notice that, since this point is contained in the face
Q ∩ R of Q and R, it must be a convex combination of the points in
ext(I, J) ∩ ext(I ,J )
However, since η<η ∗, we know that at least one of these points must be of the form
(0,0,p,q). Thus, Q ∩ R contains the point (δ,ε,p,q) with (δ,ε) completely mixed as well
as a point of the form (0,0,p,q). Hence, there is an edge between (I, J) and (I ,J ) and
that contradicts the assumption that (J1,E 1) and (J2,E 2) are disjoint. 
Finally notice that, given J, the graph (J,E) can be constructed in a ﬁnite number of
operations and that the connectedness of this graph can also be checked in ﬁnite time.
6.2. How to check non-triviality
Let π(η)∗ denote the homomorphism that is induced by the projection π(η) from the
topological pair (V(η),∂ vV(η)) to the topological pair (P(η),∂P(η)) between the corre-
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sufﬁciently small η. This though is not a ﬁnite task because of the clause “for sufﬁciently
small η” in the above condition. As said before, in fact we bypass this problem by showing
it is sufﬁcient to merely check that π(η∗)∗ is not trivial.
Theorem 4. For all η<η ∗,π(η)∗ is not trivial if and only if π(η∗)∗ is not trivial.
Proof. We will apply the results from Appendix B to this situation. Take Rm = Rn =
RM × RN. Perturbations (δ,ε) will be interpreted as the x-variable and strategy pairs (p,q)
as the y-variable. Notice that this does indeed place our setting within the non-negative
orthant. Take
P :={ S(I, J) × T(I, J)|(I, J) ∈ J }.
Notice that indeed each element of P has an element of the form (0,y) = (0,0,p,q) and
an element (x,y) = (δ,ε,p,q) with x = (δ,ε)  = (0,0). Also, the collection of polytopes
in P together with all their proper faces is a polyhedral complex. Thus from Appendix B
we get that η∗ = (1/2)η∗. So, for every η ≤ η∗,P(η) is a subset of C(η∗). So we can apply
Proposition B.1 of Appendix B taking D = P(η) and we get homeomorphisms f(η) from
V(η)t oU(η∗) and gP(η) from RM
+ × RN
+ to itself such that f(η)(0,0,p,q) = (0,0,p,q)
and the diagram
commutes. Thus we get that the maps f := f(η∗)−1 ◦ f(η) and g := (gP(η∗))−1 ◦ gP(η) are
homeomorphisms, f(0,0,p,q) = (0,0,p,q), and the diagram
commutes.NownoticethatgisahomeomorphismfromP(η)toP(η∗).So,itmustbeahome-
omorphism from the topological pair (P(η),∂P(η)) to the topological pair (P(η∗),∂P(η∗)).
Now the commutativity of the above diagram implies that the map f is a homeomorphism
fromthetopologicalpair(V(η),∂ v(V(η)))tothetopologicalpair(V(η∗),∂ v(V(η∗))).Hence,
the diagram
commutes and f∗ and g∗ are isomorphisms. Now the theorem immediately follows. 20 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx







Let I be a ﬁnite5 set of indices. A (ﬁnite) collection
P :={ Pi|i ∈ I}
of (non-empty) polytopes is called a polyhedral complex if the faces of each Pi are also
elements of P and, moreover, each intersection Pi ∩ Pj is a face of both Pi and Pj as
soon as this intersection is not empty. A polyhedral complex C whose elements are all sim-
plices is called a simplicial complex. A reﬁnement of P is a polyhedral complex R such
that each polytope in R is a subset of some polytope in P and, secondly, each polytope
P in P is the union if polytopes in R. The reﬁnement R is called simplicial if R hap-
pens to be a simplicial complex. The underlying space of the polyhedral complex P is the
set
∪P∈PP.
Let P be a polyhedral complex with underlying space X and let Q be a polyhedral complex
with underlying space Y. A map f from X to Y is said to be polyhedral from P to Q if f
maps each polytope P in P linearly 6 onto an element of Q. Now let P be a polyhedral
complex in Rm × Rn with underlying space X. Furthermore, let π : X → Rm be deﬁned
by π(x,y): = x.
Lemma4. Usingonlylinearoptimizationtechniquesandﬁniteenumerationswecancom-
pute a simplicial reﬁnement C of P together with a simplicial complex D whose underlying
space is π(X) such that π is a polyhedral map from C to D.
It is essential for our main assertion in this section, the computability of standard stable
sets in ﬁnite time using exclusively linear optimization techniques and ﬁnite enumerations,
that all manipulations and computations used in the proof of this lemma can indeed be
executed only using linear optimization techniques and ﬁnite enumerations. Although
we do not prove that here, the details can be found in Vermeulen and Jansen (2004,
Appendix B).
5 In most textbooks ﬁniteness is not required. We however will encounter only ﬁnite complexes in this article,
so we will make life a bit easier and develop the required machinery only for ﬁnite complexes.
6 ThemapfiscalledlinearonapolytopePifforeveryxandyinPandλin[0,1]wehavethatf(λx + (1 − λ)y) =
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Now we turn back to the main goal in this section. We will explain how the result from
Lemma 4 can be used to check in ﬁnite time whether or not π(η∗)∗ is trivial. First we will
explain how one can construct a polyhedral complex P whose underlying space is V(η∗).
Since V is the union of the sets S(I, J) × T(I, J) where the pairs (I, J) range through the
set J, it is clear that V(η∗) is the union over all (I, J)i nJ of the sets
[S(I, J) × T(I, J)](η∗)
It can easily be checked that such a set is a polytope and that, if not empty, the intersection
of two such sets is a face of both. Given these facts, it is straightforward to check that the
collection P of all sets
[S(I, J) × T(I, J)](η∗)
with (I, J)i nJ together with their faces is a polyhedral complex. Also notice that, given
J, this complex can be computed in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Giventheaboveterminology,Lemma4appliedtotheprojectionmapπontheunderlying
space V(η∗) of the polyhedral complex P constructed above states that there is a simplicial
complex C with underlying space V(η∗) and a simplicial complex D with underlying space
π(V(η∗)) = P(η∗) such that the projection π from V(η∗)t oP(η∗) is a polyhedral map from
C to D.
In order to establish the connection with relative simplicial homology, we also need to
consider the following two subcomplexes.7 Let B be the simplicial subcomplex of D whose
underlying space is ∂P(η∗) and let A be the simplicial subcomplex of C whose underlying
space is ∂vV(η∗).
Nownoticethatπ isautomaticallyapolyhedralmapfrom(C,A)to(D,B),meaningthat
it is a polyhedral map from C to D such that the image under π of each element of A is an
element of B. Therefore π induces a homomorphism from the simplicial homology group
Hd(X,A) to the simplicial homology group Hd(Y,B) as follows. Let π# : Cd(X,A) →
Cd(Y,B) be the homomorphism induced by the map that assigns
π#([v0,...,v d] + Cd(A))
:=
 
[π(v0),...,π(vd)] + Cd(B) if allπ(v0),...,π(vd)aredistinct
Cd(B) else
to each element [v0,...,v d] + Cd(A)o fCd(X,A). It can be shown in the diagram
below:
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that the homomorphism π# commutes with the boundary operator. We can therefore deﬁne
a map π∗sim : Hd(X,A) → Hd(Y,B) by, for all k ∈ Ker(∂d),
π∗sim(k + Im(∂d+1)) := π#(k) + Im(∂d+1)
Thismapisagainahomomorphism.NowTheorem34.4ofMunkres(1984)statesthatthere
exist isomorphisms m∗ and n∗ such that the diagram
commutes. Thus the central question in this section, whether we can in some sense check
in ﬁnite time whether π∗ is the trivial map or not, boils down to the question: can we check
in ﬁnite time whether or not the map
Hd(C,A)
π∗sim −→ Hd(D,B)
we just deﬁned is trivial. As it turns out, this is indeed possible. First notice that, since there
actually are procedures to compute the complexes C and D, we can also compute bases for
the groups Cd(C,A) and Cd(D,B) in ﬁnite time. Given these bases we will show how we
can compute a basis for Ker(∂d) and Im(∂d).
To this end, take an enumeration b1,...,b k of the ﬁnite collection of basis elements
υ + Cd(A)o fCd(C,A), where υ ranges through the collection of oriented d-simplices
not contained in A. Similarly, let c1,...,c m be an enumeration of the ﬁnite collection of
basis elements w + Cd−1(A)o fCd−1(C,A). Now note that ∂d is a homomorphism from
Cd(C,A)t oCd−1(C,A). So, the entire map ∂d is determined by the images
∂d(b1),...,∂ d(bk)






of each ∂d(bi) in terms of the basis c1,...,c m of Cd−1(C,A). Thus we can represent the













D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx 23
Consider the following elementary operations that we will allow on this integer matrix.
(1) interchange row i and row k,
(2) multiply row i by −1, and
(3) replace row i by row i +r o wk for k  = i.
Eachofthesethreeoperationscorrespondtoatransformationofthecurrentbasisb1,...,b k.
The ﬁrst operation corresponds to an interchange of bi and bk. The second operation corre-
sponds to a replacement of bi by −bi and the third to a replacement of bi by bi + bk.
Obviously we can deﬁne similar operations on the columns that correspond to similar
operations on the current basis c1,...,c m. In particular, the replacement of column j by
columnj+columnlcorrespondstothereplacementofcl bycl − cj (!).NowfromMunkres
(1984, Section 11, Theorem 11.3), we get the following result.
Proposition 1. Using the above six elementary operations we can construct in a ﬁnite
number of steps bases d1,...,d k of Cd(C,A) and e1,...,e k of Cd−1(C,A) such that the


















where p1,...,p r are positive integers and each   is a null-matrix of appropriate dimen-
sions.
It can be checked that the change of bases mentioned in the above proposition can be
performed in a ﬁnite number of steps, each of which involves only a ﬁnite number of
algebraic computations. Thus we get a basis e1,...,e r for Im(∂d) and a basis dr+1,...,d k
for Ker(∂d). Now it can easily be seen that π∗sim is trivial if and only if
π#(dr+1),...,π #(dk)
are all elements of the subgroup Im(∂d+1)o fCd(D,B). This however can be tested in ﬁnite
time as follows. As shown above we can use Proposition 1 to construct a basis g1,...,g s
of Im(∂d+1). Once we have computed this basis, note that
π#(dr+1),...,π #(dk)






However, since all π#(di) and all gj can be represented as vectors in ZD\B, this is equivalent
to asking whether a certain integer-valued linear system has an (and in that case automat-24 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx
ically unique) integer-valued solution. This though can easily be tested using Gaussian
elimination.
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Appendix A. Simplicial homology groups
Let σ be a simplex, and let {v0,...,v d} be its set of vertices. Then the dimension of this
simplex is d and it is simply called a d-simplex. An orientation of a simplex is an ordering
of its vertices modulo even permutations. A simplex together with an orientation of this
simplex is called an oriented simplex. It is generically denoted by υ = [v0,...,v d].
Let C be a simplicial complex. Choose for each simplex σ ∈ C, an (arbitrary) orientation
and denote the collection of all oriented simplices thus constructed by C. Consider the
Abelian group ZC generated by C. We identiﬁed an element υ of C with the characteristic
function 1 lυ of {υ} in ZC. It turns out to be convenient to identify the opposite orientation





in ZC in which nα is non-zero only if υα is an oriented d-simplex. The subgroup of ZC of
all d-chains on C is denoted by Cd(C) and is called the group of oriented d-chains of C.I t
is evidently generated by the set of elementary d-chains [v0,...,v d].
A.1. The boundary operator





where [v0,...,ˆ vi,...,v d]: = [v0,...,v i−1,v i+1,...,v d]. It can be shown that this is in-
deed a correct deﬁnition. Since the collection of elementary d-chains is a basis for Cd(C),
this deﬁnition extends uniquely to a homomorphism
∂d : Cd(C) → Cd−1(C).
The resulting map is called the boundary operator in dimension d. The kernel of ∂d in
Cd(C) is known as the group of d-cycles and its image in Cd−1(C) is called the group of
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A.2. Relative homology groups
Now let C be a simplicial complex with associated collection C of oriented simplices.
Furthermore let C0 be a subcomplex of C and denote its associated collection of oriented
simplices by C0. The group Cd0 := Cd(C0) of those d-chains on C that only take non-zero
values on elements of C0 is a subgroup of Cd(C).8 So, we can deﬁne the quotient group
Cd(C,C0) whose elements are the sets of the form
υ + Cd0 :={ υ + w|w ∈ Cd0}
where υ ranges through Cd(C). This Abelian group is called the group of relative chains of
dimension d. Deﬁne the map ∂d from the group Cd(C,C0) of relative d-chains to the group
Cd−1(C,C0) of relative d − 1-chains by
∂d(υ + Cd0): = ∂d(υ) + Cd−1,0
for all υ + Cd0 in Cd(C,C0). One easily checks that ∂d is a homomorphism and that






A convenient setting to see how homology groups look like is the one where C0 is empty
– so homology groups are deﬁned directly on Cd(C) instead of Cd(C,C0) – and where
C only contains zero-dimensional and one-dimensional oriented simplices. In the ﬁeld of
combinatorial optimization such a setting is called a directed ﬂow network.
This network has four (oriented) vertices a, b, c and d, and four oriented 1-simplices,
namely the arcs [a,b], [b,d], [d,c] and [c,a]. The arcs can be thought of as pipelines
through which water or oil is transported from one node to the other in the direction of the
arrow. Negative amounts correspond to ﬂows in the opposite direction. Now suppose we
transport the amounts α from a to b, β from b to d, γ from d to c, and ζ from c to a. This
corresponds to the 1-chain
c = α[a,b] + β[b,d] + γ[d,c] + ζ[c,a]
8 This is a slight abuse of notation. Formally the elements of Cd(C0) are elements of ZC0, not of ZC.26 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx
All that the boundary operator ∂1 does is computing the resulting net stock of ﬂuid in the
nodes (vertices) of the network. So, as can be seen in the picture, the net stock in, e.g., a
is ζ − α and the net stock in c is γ − ζ. In total the resulting 0-chain when we apply the
boundary operator ∂1 to the above 1-chain is
∂1(c) = (ζ − α)a + (α − β)b + (β − γ)c + (γ − ζ)d
Now, the 1-chain is called a ﬂow in the network when the resulting net stock in each node
equals zero, that is, when in each node the inﬂow equals the outﬂow. This is precisely when
α = β = γ = ζ. In the language of homology groups this means that ∂1(c) = 0, in which
case c is an element of Ker(∂1) and called a cycle. In the above picture it is very clear why
one would like to call c a cycle (or a ﬂow) whenever α = β = γ = ζ. And it is also clear
that Ker(∂1) is generated by
[a,b] + [b,d] + [d,c] + [c,a]
This is actually a very general principle. Consider, e.g., the disconnected network
Notice that, since there are no 2-simplices, the group Im(∂2) is the trivial group. So, the
one-dimensional homology group is simply Ker(∂1). And along the same line of reasoning
asabovewecandeducethatthelattergroupisgeneratedbythethreecycles[a,b] + [b,d] +
[d,c] + [c,a],[f, g] + [g,i] + [i, h] + [h,f] and [f, e] + [e,h] + [h,f], and must hence
be isomorphic to Z3.
Thus, the one-dimensional homology groups basically counts the number of “elemen-
tary” cycles in a network. Just like in the above network, there may be more cycles, e.g.,
e → h → i → g → f → e, but these cycles can be written as integer combinations of
cycles in the basis, in this case e → h → f → e minus f → g → i → h → f. Notice
that this way the arc [h,f] is indeed once counted in the direction of the arrow, and once
backwards. The zero-dimensional homology group, even for general simplicial complexes,
simply counts the number of connected components of the complex, and is in this case
isomorphic to Z2.
Appendix B. A homeomorphism
Consider the non-negative orthant Rm
+ × Rn
+ of the product space Rm × Rn. A generic
element of Rm × Rn is denoted by (x,y) with x in Rm and y in Rn. Further, let
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be a collection of polytopes in this non-negative orthant with the following two additional
properties. First, each polytope in this collection contains at least one element of the form
(0,y) and at least one element of the form (x,y) with x  = 0. Second, the collection of
polytopesinPtogetherwithalltheirproperfacesisapolyhedralcomplex.Foreachpolytope















For η ≤ η∗, write C(η) for the collection of points x in Rm
+ for which x1 +···+xm ≤ η.
Let Pα(η) be the collection of points (x,y)i nPα for which x is an element of C(η). Let
U(η) be the union over all sets Pα(η) for Pα in P. Let D ⊂ Rm be a compact and convex
neighborhood of 0 with the additional property that d is a subset of C(η∗). Write
V :={ (x,y) ∈ U(η∗)|x ∈ D}
and
∂vV :={ (x,y) ∈ U(η∗)|x ∈ ∂D}.
For x in Rm
+, write  x  :=
 m






 x  ∈ D
 
if x  = 0
1i f x = 0
Obviously,ηtakesonpositivevaluesexclusively.Furthermore,ηiscontinuouseverywhere,
exceptperhapsinx = 0.Alsonotethatxisanelementofdifandonlyif x ≤η(x).Deﬁne








Even though η need not be continuous in x = 0, it can easily be veriﬁed that g is a home-
omorphism from D to C(η∗). Let π be the projection from Rm × Rn onto Rm deﬁned by
π(x,y): = x. In this setting the following can be shown.
9 Notice that the map g actually depends on D.28 D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx
PropositionB.1. Thereexistsahomeomorphismf : V → U(η∗)suchthatf(0,y) = (0,y)
and the diagram
commutes.
The proof of this proposition takes several pages and can be found in Vermeulen and
Jansen (2004). The intuition though behind this construction is fairly clear. Consider a
polytopePα inthecollectionP.ForthemomentwecanactasifPα istheonlyelementofP.
Let the large triangle that is partially displayed in the picture below be the set C(η∗). So,
the smaller, shaded, triangle depicts the set U(η∗) as can be seen above. It is the projection
of the set Pα(η∗) represented by the triangular block. Now let the square displayed below
represent the set d. As one can see, it is indeed a subset of C(η∗). Now it is clear that one
can map d homeomorphically onto C(η∗) by simply rescaling each ray emanating from the
origin by an appropriate scaling factor. This is precisely what g does. It is also clear that
this way g induces a homeomorphism from the darker shaded area to U(η∗).
Now the set V is the smaller block displayed below. The proposition states that there
exists a homeomorphism from this smaller block V to the larger block Pα(η∗) such that the
set above the origin in the ground ﬂoor space is mapped identically onto itself and such
that ﬁrst using f and then projecting down is the same as ﬁrst projecting down, and then
applying g.D. Vermeulen, M. Jansen / Journal of Mathematical Economics xxx (2004) xxx–xxx 29
In the situation above it is actually quite clear how f should be chosen. It is simply a
matter of mimicking g at each vertical level. However, when Pα is higher-dimensional, one
may have many ways to choose these “vertical levels” due to the fact that the number of
extreme points of Pα(η∗) counted in a “vertical” direction (this number being 2 in this case)
may be much higher than the dimension of the strategy space (which is taken to be 1 in
the above pictures). All that the proposition is saying is that one can choose a speciﬁc way
to do this anyway, and that one can even do it in such a way that the map constructed acts
identically on overlapping parts of different polyhedra of P.
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